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CASE COMMENT
United States v. Dixon The Supreme Court
Returns to the Traditional Standard for Double
Jeopardy Clause Analysis*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1969, the Supreme Court determined that the guarantee
against double jeopardy' was a "fundamental ideal in our consti-
tutional heritage," and thus held that this protection applied to
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.2 Even though the
Supreme Court has deemed this guarantee "fundamental," it has
struggled to set forth a definitive standard to assist lower courts in
analyzing potential double jeopardy clause violations. The Supreme
Court has also not clearly addressed the underlying policy interests
of this protection. In fact, then Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
Supreme Court in "Albernaz v. United States,' recognized that the
"decisional law" of the, Double Jeopardy Clause "is a veritable
Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid
judicial navigator."4
Much of the confusion regarding the identification of the
appropriate Double Jeopardy Clause standard concerns the Su-
preme Court's specification of two competing policy justifications
for this protection. In Blockburger v. United States,5 the Supreme
Court stated what has been recognized as the "established"6 or
* The author wishes to thank Professor jimmy Gurul6 for his guidance and support
in writing this Note.
I The Double Jeopardy Clause provides, "nor shall any person be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
Double Jeopardy Clause embodies three protections: "It protects against a second prosecu-
tion for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the
same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same
offense." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
2 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794-95 (1969).
3 450 U.S. 333 (1981).
4 Id. at 343.
5 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), reling on Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434
(1871).
6 Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977).
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"principal"7 test for determining whether two offenses are the
same for double jeopardy purposes. The Supreme Court sought to
advance the policy interest of finality: ensuring that a defendant
would not be tried or punished twice for the "same offense."' In
Green v. United States,9 the Supreme Court, though not advocating
the use of a specific standard, set forth a more expansive rationale
for this guarantee:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least
the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State
with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged of-
fense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and
ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of
anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that
even though innocent he may be found guilty."
Throughout double jeopardy case law since Green, the Justices of
the Supreme Court have been divided on whether the Blockburger.
standard advances these policy interests. In 1990, in Grady v.
Corbin," five Justices agreed that the Blockburger standard did not
advance the policy reasons set forth in Green and thus established
a second prong to the traditional Blockburger test. Under this
prong, courts were required to consider whether the "conduct"
underlying the offenses was the same, in which case a subsequent
prosecution would be barred.12
In 1993, in United States v. Dixon," the Supreme Court over-
ruled the Grady decision and revived the traditional Blockburger
standard. 4 However, the Supreme Court continues to disagree
7 Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 416 (1980).
8 See Ex Pae Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168-69 (1873) ("The common law not
only prohibited a second punishment for the same offense, but it went further and for-
bid a second trial for the same offense, whether the accused had suffered punishment or
not, and whether in the former trial he had been acquitted or convicted."); United
States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896) ("The prohibition is not against being twice pun-
ished, but against being twice put in jeopardy, and the accused, whether convicted or
acquitted, is equally put in jeopardy at the first trial"); Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S.
333, 334 (1907); Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 339 (1910).
9 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
10 Id. at 187-88.
11 495 U.S. 508 (1990). The five Justices included Justice Brennan, Justice White,
Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Stevens. At the time the Dixon decision
was handed down, two of the five Justices comprising the Grady majority, Justice Brennan
and Justice Marshall, had retired.
12 Id. at 515-16, 521.
13 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
14 This standard does not require courts to consider whether the "conduct" under-
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about the proper scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause protection.
This disagreement is apparent by the 5-4 split in the Dixon deci-
sion. The majority did not address the issue that the Blockburger
standard does not satisfy the Green policy interests, but rather
allows for piecemeal litigation." Analyzing the Dixon decision,
which requires use of the Blockburger standard, the Eleventh Circuit
stated, "[a]s the test now stands, it is difficult to see many circum-
stances under which the double jeopardy clause will place any
check on a prosecutor who displays a minimum degree of care in
crafting indictments.""
This Note recognizes the confusion that underlies the appli-
cation of the Double Jeopardy Clause and sets forth an alternative
standard for reconciling the differing policy interests. Part II pro-
vides a historical case review of the Supreme Court's Double Jeop-
ardy Clause decisions prior to Dixon. Part III analyzes the Supreme
Court's most recent decision, Dixon, focusing on the Justices' vari-
ous applications of the Blockburger standard, the reasons for over-
ruling Grady, and Justice Souter's analysis of why Grady should
have been upheld. Part IV discusses the status of Double Jeopardy
Clause jurisprudence after Dixon and addresses some issues which
were left unanswered by the Dixon decision.
II. REVIEW OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE PRIOR TO DIXON
A. The Supreme Court's Early Decisions
When the Supreme Court was confronted with addressing the
appropriate Double Jeopardy Clause standard in 1932, it could
have interpreted this Fifth Amendment guarantee in a variety of
ways. Arguably, the most straightforward application would have
been a literal interpretation of the term "same offense,"" where-
by an acquittal or prior prosecution of a robbery charge, for ex-
ample, would preclude a subsequent prosecution for that same
robbery. The Supreme Court, in Blockburger,8 however, did not
lying the offenses was the same. Rather, the Blockburger standard focuses on whether the
statutory elements of the offenses are the same.
15 See infra notes 37-40.
16 United States v. Sanchez, 3 F.3d 366, 367 (1993).
17 The Double Jeopardy Clause provides, "nor shall any person.be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
18 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Grady v. Corbin, argued that the
B!ockburger decision concerned and applied only to double jeopardy issues involving multi-
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adopt such a literal interpretation of the term, but rather followed
a Massachusetts Supreme Court decision which held that "where
the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct
statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether
there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision
requires proof of a fact which the other does not."9 Focusing on
the statutory elements of the two offenses, the Supreme Court
stated that "if each statute requires proof of an additional fact
which the other does not," the offenses are not considered the
"same offense" under the Blockburger test.2"
Since Blockburger, the Supreme Court has expanded the inqui-
ry a court must make when engaging in a Double Jeopardy Clause
analysis. In addition to examining the statutory elements of the of-
fenses to determine whether they are the same, as required under
Blockburger,21 a court must also consider whether one offense is a
lesser included offense of the other.' In Brown v. Ohio, the Su-
preme Court applied this lesser included offense analysis to the
crimes of joyriding and auto theft:
Joyriding consists of taking or operating a vehicle without the
owner's consent, and auto theft consists of joyriding with the
intent permanently to deprive the owner of possession ....
The prosecutor who has established joyriding need only prove
ple punishments and not to multiple prosecutions. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 516-18
(1990). See infra notes 36-41. However, the Blockburger standard has been used in both
contexts, as Justice Scalia documented in Grady. Id. at 535-36. Furthermore, by overruling
Grady, the Dixon decision eliminated any question that may remain by concluding that
courts should apply the "same elements test" in Double Jeopardy cases. See, e.g., United
States v. Colon-Osorio, 10 F.3d 41, 45 (1993).
19 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), quoting Morey v. Com-
monwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871). Justice Scalia has provided further insight into the
application of this standard: "If it is possible to violate each one without violating the
other, then they cannot constitute the 'same offense.'" Grady, 495 U.S. at 529.
20 Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304 (citation omitted); see also Iannelli v. United States,
420 U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975). In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has articulated
further parameters by stating what the term does not mean: (1) "same transaction,"
Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 790 (1985); but see Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436
(1970) (Brennan, J., concurring), Waller v. Florida, 414 U.S. 945 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); or (2) "same evidence," see Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 521-22 (1990);
Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990). But see James K. Gatz, Grady v. Corbin: A
New Approach for Insuring Defendant's Fifth Amendment Rights in Successive Prosecutions for
Separate Offenses Arising From An Incident, 36 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 769 (1992).
21 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
22 Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 167-68 (1977).
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the requisite intent in order to establish auto theft; the prose-
cutor who has established auto theft necessarily has established
joyriding as well.
The Brown Court held that because the lesser offense, joyriding,
required no proof beyond that required for the greater offense of
auto theft, the two were the "same offense" for purposes of the
Double Jeopardy Clause.24
Furthermore, under the Supreme Court's decision in Harris v.
Oklahoman a court must determine whether one offense is a
"species of a lesser-included offense" of the other, thereby expand-
ing the analysis required under Brown. In the per curiam decision,
the Court found that commission of a stated felony, in this case
robbery, was a lesser included offense of the felony murder rule
and was thus barred." Three years after this decision, the Court,
in Illinois v. Vitale, interpreting Harris, stated: "[W]e did not con-
sider the crime generally described as felony murder as a separate
offense distinct from its various elements. Rather, we treated a kill-
ing in the course of a robbery as itself a separate statutory offense,
and the robbery as a species of a lesser-included offense."2" Thus, in
addition to examining the statutory elements of the offenses to
determine whether they are the same, a court under Brown and
Harris must also analyze whether one offense is a lesser or greater
included offense or a species of a lesser included offense of the
other.
In-addition to interpreting the Harris decision, the Supreme
Court considered in Vitale whether, under the Double Jeopardy
Clause, a conviction for failure to reduce speed to avoid an acci-
dent barred a subsequent prosecution for involuntary manslaugh-
ter.28 The Vitale Court established that: "[t]he mere possibility that
the State will seek to rely on all of the ingredients necessarily
included in the traffic offense to establish an element of its man-
slaughter case would not be sufficient to bar the latter
prosecution."' Although it ultimately held that the second prose-
cution was not barred, the Vitale Court, in dictum, also alluded to
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 433 U.S. 682 (1977).
26 See infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text for Chief Justice Rehnquist's discus-
sion of Hanis.
27 Illinois v. Vitale, 477 U.S. 410, 420 (1980) (emphasis added).
28 Id. at 412.
29 Id. at 419 (emphasis added).
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a situation where the Blockburger inquiry would not suffice, in
which case a court would also be required to consider a
defendant's conduct:
[I]t may be that to sustain its manslaughter case the State may
find it necessary to prove a failure to slow or to rely on con-
duct necessarily involving such failure; it may concede as much
prior to trial. In that case, because Vitale has already been
convicted for conduct that is a necessary element of the more
serious crime for which he has been charged, his claim of
double jeopardy would be substantial under Brown. [v. Ohio]
and our later decision in Harris v. Oklahoma.30
The Supreme Court subsequently applied this language to reach
its holding in Grady v. Corbin.
B. Grady v. Corbin-The Departure from the
Traditional Blockburger Standard
The Supreme Court in 1990 adopted a two prong standard
for determining whether two offenses are the same for purposes
of the Double Jeopardy Clause. In Grady,"' Corbin drove his auto-
mobile over the double yellow line and struck a second vehicle,
killing one person and seriously injuring another. Corbin was
issued two traffic citations, one for driving while intoxicated and
the other for failing to keep right of the median. 2 Corbin plead-
ed guilty to the traffic tickets and was sentenced to a $350 fine, a
$10 surcharge, and a six-month license revocation.3 Two months
later, a grand jury indicted Corbin on five charges.-" The bill of
particulars specified that the State intended to use three acts as
evidence for the five charges: driving while intoxicated, failing to
keep right of the median, and driving too fast for the inclement
weather conditions. 5 Because he had previously been convicted
and sentenced for two of the acts, Corbin subsequently filed a
motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. 6
30 Id. at 420 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
31 Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
32 Id. at 511.
33 Id. at 513.
34 The charges were reckless manslaughter, second-degree vehicular manslaughter,
criminally negligent homicide for causing the death of Brenda Dirago, third degree reck-
less assault for causing physical injury to Daniel Dirago, and driving while intoxicated. Id.
35 I& at 513-14.
36 Id. at 514.
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In reaching its decision to establish a two prong standard, the
Grady Court determined that the Blockburger test would not further
the policy interests set forth in Green.7 Writing for the, majori-
ty, Justice Brennan stated that the Blockburger decision applied
only to cases involving multiple punishments," because multiple
prosecutions raised different concerns which the Blockburger stan-
dard could not and did not address.' In addition, Justice
Brennan asserted that the Blockburger standard would allow for
subsequent prosecutions of offenses which had different statutory
elements but the same conduct.41 Specifically, with regard to
Corbin's case, Justice Brennan stated:
If Blockburger constituted the entire double jeopardy inquiry in
the context of successive prosecutions, the State could try
Corbin in four consecutive trials: for failure to keep right of
the median; for driving while intoxicated, for assault and for
homicide. The State could improve its presentation of proof
with each trial, assessing which witnesses gave the most per-
suasive testimony, which documents had the greatest impact,
and which opening and closing arguments most persuaded the
jurors.'
Thus, the Supreme Court adopted the language in Vtale43 and
applied a two prong standard.
Under the Grady standard, a court was required to first apply
the traditional and expanded version" of the Blockburger test, fo-
cusing on whether the statutory elements of the two offenses were
the same.4' If a court determined that the offenses were indeed
the same, the subsequent prosecution would be barred. Under the
second prong of the Grady standard, a court was required to con-
sider whether if, "to establish an essential element of an offense
37 Grady, 495 U.S. at 518-19; see supra note 10.
38 The Supreme Court was closely divided on this issue - the decision was 5-4. For
the discussion regarding Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion, see infra notes 101-08 and ac-
companying text.
39 For a discussion on the "multiple punishment doctrine," see Kenneth G. Schuler,
Continuing Criminal Enterprise, Conspiracy, and the Multiple Punishment Doctrine, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 2220, 2222-32 (1993).
40 Grady, 495 U.S. at 518-19.
41 Id. at 520-21.
42 Id. (citations omitted).
43 See supra note 30.
44 For a discussion concerning the expanded version of the Blockburger standard, see
supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
45 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
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charged in that prosecution, [the government] will prove conduct
that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already
been prosecuted."4 6 Applying this standard in Corbin's case, the
Supreme Court concluded that although the crimes did not consti-
tute the "same offense" under Blockburger, the subsequent prosecu-
tion was barred under the application of the second prong of the
Grady standard.47 Specifically, the Grady Court reached this con-
clusion because the State conceded that, as in the first prosecu-
tion, the same conduct, namely driving while intoxicated- and
failing to keep right of a median, would have been used to con-
vict Corbin in the second prosecution."
Several lower courts had difficulty applying the two prong
standard set forth in Grady. For example, in Ladner v. Smith,49 the
Fifth Circuit interpreted the second prong of the Grady standard
as requiring "much more than a mere search for congruity of con-
duct."5 The Fifth Circuit adopted a four-step analysis for analyz-
ing the facts of a case under the second prong of Grady:
(1) Identify each essential element of the offense with which
the defendant is charged in the second prosecution.
(2) Determine what conduct of the defendant the state propos-
es to prove to establish each essential element identified in
step one.
(3) Examine the conduct determined in step two to see if, in
and of itself, such conduct constitutes one or more separate
and distinct offenses for which a person could be prosecuted.
(4) Determine whether, in the first prosecution, the defendant
was in fact prosecuted for one or more of the separate and
distinct offenses found in step three.5'
In addition, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Dixon, pro-
vided several cases to prove that courts have had difficulty in ap-
plying the Grady two prong standard.52
46 Grady, 495 U.S. at 521. This language looks to "what conduct the State will prove,
not the evidence the State will use to prove that conduct." Id.
47 Id. at 522-23.
48 Id.
49 941 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1991).
50 Id. at 361.
51 Id. at 362.
52 United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993). Justice Scalia cited: Vives v. Unit-
ed States, 113 S. Ct. 497 (1992); Sharpton v. Turner, 964 F.2d 1284, 1287 (2d Cir.
1992); United States v. Calderone, 917 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Prusan,
780 F. Supp. 1431, 1434-36; State v. Woodfork, 239 Neb. 720, 725 (1991); Eatherton v.
State, 810 P.2d 93, 99, 104 (Wyo. 1991). Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2864 n.16.
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Furthermore, two years after Grady was decided, the Supreme
Court, in United States v. Felix,53 recognized an exception to the
"same conduct test." Felix manufactured methamphetamine in
Oklahoma in violation of various federal statutes.54 Following a
DEA raid, Felix moved his operation to Missouri and ordered
chemicals and equipment from a DEA informant. Felix was arrest-
ed, tried, and convicted for the offense of attempting to manufac-
ture methamphetamine in Missouri.55 During the trial in Missou-
ri, the government, in accordance with Rule 404(b) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence,5 introduced evidence of the Oklahoma opera-
tion to prove Felix's state of mind. Subsequently, the government
charged Felix and five others with conspiracy to manufacture,
possess, and distribute methamphetamine in Oklahoma, along with
several substantive drug offense charges." The government intro-
duced much of the same evidence at the trial in Oklahoma that
was previously introduced at the trial in* Missouri. Although Felix
was convicted in the lower court, the Tenth Circuit, relying on
Grady, concluded that a Double Jeopardy Clause violation had
occurred and thus reversed the lower court's decision.58 Chief
Justice Rehnquist, applying the decision of Dowling v. United
States,59 determined that the introduction of prior acts as evi-
dence was permitted under Rule 404(b).' In addition, the Su-
preme Court recognized two exceptions to the Grady principle,
namely that (1) a substantive crime and conspiracy to commit that
crime are not the "same offense,"'" and that (2) the lesser in-
53 112 S. Ct. 1377 (1992).
54 Id. at 1379.
55 Id. at 1380.
56 "Evidence of prior acts is admissible to prove 'motive, opportunity, intent, prep-
aration, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.'" FED. . EViD.
404(b).
57 United States v. Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377, 1380-81 (1992).
58 Id. at 1381.
59 493 U.S. 342 (1990). Dowling was charged with bank robbery, armed robbery,
and other crimes under Virgin Islands law for allegedly stealing over $12,000 from the
First Pennsylvania Bank. Id. at 344. As Dowling fled the scene, an eyewitness saw his face
and was later able to identify Dowiing as the robber. At trial, the government introduced
a witness who testified that she was robbed two weeks prior to the bank robbery. During
the robbery, she unmasked the intruder and was able to identify him as Dowling.
Dowling, however, was acquitted of this charge. Id. at 344-45. On the basis of the Double
Jeopardy Clause, Dowling objected to the introduction of that evidence of the robbery in
the subsequent prosecution. The Court held that the introduction of this evidence to
show identity was permissible under Rule 404(b). Id. at 348-49.
60 Felix, 112 S. Ct. at 1383.
61 Id. at 1383-84.
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cluded offense analysis applied only in the context of a single
course of conduct, not multilayered conduct.62
III. THE REVIVAL OF THE TRADITIONAL
"SAME ELEMENTS" STANDARD
In United States v. Dixon,63 the Supreme Court reviewed the
applicability of the "same conduct test" as established in Grady.'
In the first of two consolidated cases, Dixon was arrested and
charged with second-degree murder. Under the terms of his re-
lease, Dixon was prohibited from committing any criminal of-
fense.' Dixon was subsequently arrested and indicted for posses-
sion of cocaine with intent to distribute, thereby violating the
terms of his release order. Convicted of contempt, Dixon was
sentenced to 180 days in jail.' Based upon. double jeopardy
grounds, Dixon subsequently moved for and was granted dismissal
of the count charging possession of cocaine with intent to distrib-
ute. 7
In the second case, Ana Foster obtained a civil protection
order against her husband requiring that he not "molest, assault,
or in any manner threaten or physically abuse" her.' Ana subse-
quently filed three separate contempt motions alleging that her
husband had committed three separate threats and two assaults in
violation of the civil protection order.69 Although he was acquit-
ted of the alleged threats, Foster was convicted of simple assault
and sentenced to 600 days in jail.70 A later indictment charged
62 I1& at 1385. See also Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777-79 (1975); Garrett
v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 778 (1985), United States v. Deshaw, 974 F.2d 667 (5th
Cir. 1992). Many federal appellate courts have adopted a five part totality of the circum-
stances test for determining whether two offenses are the same in the context of conspir-
acy cases. The five factors include: "(a) the time during which the activities occurred; (b)
the persons involved in the two conspiracies; (c) the places involved; (d) whether the
same evidence was used to prove the two conspiracies; and (e) whether the same
statutory provision was involved in both conspiracies." United States v. Garcia-Rosa, 876
F.2d 209, 228-29 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Jarvis, 7 F.3d 404, 410-11 (4th Cir.
1993); United States v. Dortch, 5 F.3d 1056, 1061 (7th Cir. 1993).
63 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
64 See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
65 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2853. Failure to follow the release order would result in the
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Foster with simple assault (Count I), threatening to injure another
(Counts II through IV), and assault with intent to kill (Count
V).11 Like Dixon, Foster filed a motion to dismiss, contending
that the second prosecution would constitute a Double Jeopardy
Clause violation. The district court denied this motion. 2
On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals consol-
idated the two cases and applied the two prong standard set forth
in Grady. The court held that a subsequent prosecution in either
case would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.7" The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine "whether the Double Jeopar-
dy Clause bars prosecution of a defendant on substantive criminal
charges based upon the same conduct for which he previously has
been held in criminal contempt of court."74
A. Part IIl-A of the Dixon Decision7
In addressing this issue, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
purported to apply Grady's two prong standard. Under the first
prong, namely the traditional Blockburger test,7' the Supreme
Court analyzed whether the criminal contempt charges77 and the
substantive acts constituted the "same offense." With regard to
Dixon and Count I of Foster's case, the Supreme Court relied
upon its prior decision in Harris, where it specified that "'the
crime generally described as felony murder' is not 'a separate
offense distinct from its various elements."'78 Applying this lan-
guage to Dixon's case, Dixon was forbidden under the terms of
his release order to commit any criminal offense, thereby making
any subsequent violation of the governing criminal code an ele-
ment of the offense of contempt.79 Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, stated that Dixon's substantive crime, possession of co-





75 Justice Scalia was joined by Justice White, Justice Stevens, Justice Kennedy and
Justice Souter.
76 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
77 Justice Scalia determined that criminal contempt, "at least the sort enforced
through nonsummary proceedings, is 'a crime in the ordinary sense2" Dixon, 113 S. Ct.
at 2856 (quoting Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968)).
78 Id. at 2857 (quoting Vital, 447 U.S. at 420-21).
79 Id.
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offense" of violating his release order." Likewise, the Supreme
Court concluded that in Foster's case, the charge of simple assault
underlying the subsequent prosecution was "based on the same
event that was the subject of his prior contempt convic-
tion . ."" Justice Scalia refused to consider the differing policy
interests underlying prosecution of criminal contempt and the
charged substantive acts. 2 Instead, he relied upon the text of the
Fifth Amendment "which looks to whether the offenses are the
same, not the interests that the offenses violate."" Therefore, the
Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the
subsequent prosecution of the substantive offenses in both cases.
In his opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
84
Chief Justice Rehnquist disagreed with Justice Scalia's application
of the Blockburger standard to Dixon's case and to Count I in
Foster's case. In critiquing Justice Scalia's application of the
Blockburger standard, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, "[i]t is some-
what ironic, I think, that Justice Scalia today adopts a view of
double jeopardy that did not come to the fore until after Grady, a
decision which he (for the Court) goes on to emphatically reject
80 Id. The Government relied upon In Re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 594 (1895), for the
contention that "it attempted to exclude certain nonsummary contempt prosecutions from
various constitutional protections for criminal defendants . . . ." Justice Scalia concluded
that Debs was not controlling because Bloom v. United States, 391 U.S. 194 (1968), over-
ruled that decision. Id.
81 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2858.
82 Id. Justice Blackmun, in his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part,
stated:
The purpose of contempt is not to punish an offense against the community at
large but rather to punish the specific offense of disobeying a court order....
Contempt is one of the very few mechanisms available to a trial court to vindi-
cate the authority of its orders. I fear that the Court's willingness to overlook
the unique interests served by contempt proceedings not only will jeopardize the
ability of trial courts to control those defendants under their supervision but will
undermine their ability to respond effectively to unmistakable threats to their
own authority and to those who have sought the court's protection.
Id. at 2880. For a discussion of the differing policy interests between contempt of court
and the substantive acts, see The Supreme Court- Leading Cases, 107 HARV. L. REV. 144
(1993).
83 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2858. Justice White, joined by Justice Stevens and Justice
Souter as to Part I, stated that Justice Scalia did not adequately address the differing pol-
icy interests which underlie a prosecution for contempt and a prosecution for a substan-
tive offense. Although he provides a detailed analysis regarding these conflicting concerns,
Justice White ultimately agrees with Justice Scalia that the underlying offenses, not the
interests, should be the basis for the Court's decision. Id at 2869-74.
84 Justice O'Connor and Justice Thomas joined Chief Justice Rehnquist.
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as 'lack[ing] constitutional roots.'"' Chief Justice Rehnquist ar-
gued that the "same elements test" required consideration "not on
the terms of the particular court orders involved, but on the ele-
ments of contempt of court in the ordinary sense."86 To obtain a
conviction of contempt of court, the State must show (1) a court
order was made known to the defendant and (2) a willful viola-
tion of that order occurred."7 Neither of the substantive offenses
in the two cases, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute or
simple assault, "necessarily satisfied" the two elements which the
State must prove to obtain a conviction of contempt. Thus, ac-
cording to Chief Justice Rehnquist, a proper application of the
Blockburger standard would have revealed that both the contempt
charge and the substantive offenses required proof of an addition-
al element which the other did not.'
Furthermore, Chief Justice Rehnquist questioned Justice
Scalia's reliance on Harris,9 a case recognized as not having full
precedential value," for the proposition "that Harris somehow re-
quires us to look to the facts that must be pioven under the par-
ticular court orders in question (rather than under the general
law of criminal contempt) in determining whether contempt and
the related substantive offenses are the same for double jeopardy
purposes."91 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Harris
Court concluded that Oklahoma's felony murder statute required
proof of some felony as one of the elements. The Harris Court
construed this requirement as being any of the felonies which
85 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2866.
86 Id. at 2865.
87 Id. at 2866. This differs from the analysis that Justice Scalia applied with regard
to Counts II through V in Foster's case; see infra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
88 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2868.
89 See supra notes 25-27.
90 Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized that Harris was "a summary reversal" which
"'does not enjoy the full precedential value of a case argued on the merits.'" Dixon, 113
S. Ct. at 2866 (quoting Connecticut v. Doehr, 111 S. Ct. 2105, 2113 n.4 (1991)). In addi-
tion, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, "[ltoday's decision shows the pitfalls inherent in
reading too much into a 'terse per curiam'" Id. The First Circuit questioned the import
of Harris after the Dixon decision: "Harris' status is unclear. The Supreme Court in Grady
had pointed to Harris to support its argument that Blockburger was not the exclusive test
to vindicate the Double Jeopardy Clause's protection against multiple prosecutions. The
Dixon Court overruled this proposition, holding that both multiple prosecutions and mul-
tiple punishment cases are to be assessed under the identical standard, Blockburger's 'same
elements' test." United States v. Colon-Osorio, 10 F.3d 41, 45 (1st Cir. 1993).
91 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2867.
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could be used to obtain a felony murder conviction. 2 However,
in Dixon's case, for example, the applicable criminal contempt
statutes did not include a "generic reference" which "incorpo-
rate[d] the statutory elements of assault or drug distribution."93
Thus, as Harris is distinguishable from Dixon, Justice Scalia should
riot have used the Harris decision to reach the result in Dixon's
case that the substantive offenses should have been barred from
subsequent prosecution.
B. Part III-B of the Dixon DecisionP4
As for Counts II through V in Foster's case, the Supreme
Court noted that to prove a double jeopardy violation Foster's
attorney would be required to show knowledge of a civil protec-
tion order and a willful violation of one of its conditions. 5 Un-
der the civil protection order, Foster was forbidden to "molest,
assault or in any manner threaten or physically abuse his wife."98
Justice Scalia contended that Count V, assault with intent to kill,
required proof of an additional element, namely intent to kill,
which was not required to prove simple assault." Similarly, to ob-
tain a conviction of Counts II through IV, the applicable statute
required specific proof of "a threat to kidnap, to inflict bodily
injury, or to damage property;" a conviction of contempt required
that Foster be shown to have threatened Ana in any manner.9 8
Moreover, conviction of contempt required proof that Foster will-
fully violated the civil protection order, whereas the statute under-
lying Counts II through IV did not.99 The Supreme Court held
that Counts II through V contained an additional element which
was not required to prove contempt of court, and therefore did
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Blackmun, Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, Justice
Kennedy, and Justice Thomas joined this portion of the opinion.
95 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2867. Justice Scalia did not take the same approach for ana-
lyzing Dixon's case or Count I in Foster's case. See supra notes 76-83. Chief Justice
Rehnquist contended that Justice Scalia looked to "the facts that must be proven under
the particular orders in question (rather than under the general law of criminal con-
tempt) . . . ." Id at 2867.
96 Id. at 2854.
97 Id. at 2858-59.
98 Id. at 2859.
99 Id.
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not constitute the "same offense" under the Blockburger test and
accordingly the first prong of the Grady standard."°
Justice Scalia then proceeded to apply the second prong of
the Grady standard. Although the Supreme Court recognized that
Counts II through V would have been barred under the second
prong, the Supreme Court refused to uphold the two prong stan-
dard of Grady and allowed subsequent prosecution of these counts.
Justice Scalia asserted that the so-called "same conduct test" lacked
constitutional roots and was thus overruled."' 1 In reaching this
decision, Justice Scalia recognized that subject to two0 2 depar-
tures, the Blockburger decision articulated the "established" Double
Jeopardy Clause standard.0 3 Unlike the Blockburger test, Justice
Scalia found neither historical support, nor case precedent for the
"same conduct test."' Justice Scalia questioned Justice Brennan's
position set forth in Grady that, as originally suggested in dictum
in Vitale,"°5 the appropriate standard should require consideration
of the defendant's conduct.' Furthermore, Justice Scalia stated
that the decision in Dowling "foreclosed" the subsequent holding
that the majority in Grady reached. 7 Relying on Dowling, Justice
100 Id.
101 Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice
Kennedy and Justice Thomas. Id. at 2860. In Dixon, Justice Scalia deferred to his dissent-
ing opinion in Grady for his explanation of why the "same conduct test" should not be
upheld.
102 Justice Scalia acknowledged two exceptions to the Blockburger standard. The first
exception "occurs where a statutory offense expressly incorporates another statutory of-
fense without specifying the latter's elements." Grady v. Corbin 495 U.S. 508, 528 (1990);
see, e.g., Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977). The second exception, articulated in
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970), occurs "when an issue of ultimate fact has
once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated
between the same parties in any future lawsuit." However, further exceptions have been
articulated: "An exception may exist where the State is unable to proceed on the more
serious charge at the outset because the additional facts necessary to sustain that charge
have not occurred or have not been discovered despite the exercise of due diligence."
See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 n.7, (quoting Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442,
448-49 (1912)).
103 Justice Scalia based this conclusion not only on the text of the Fifth Amendment
which utilizes the term "same offense," not "same conduct," but also on historical evi-
dence. Justice Scalia's historical analysis considered Britain's double jeopardy jurisprudence
and the subsequent adherence to this rule within the early American cases. "Thus, the
Blockburger definition of 'same offense' was not invented in 1932, but reflected a venera-
ble understanding." Grady, 495 U.S. at 535.
104 United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2860 (1993).
105 See supra note 30.
106 Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 520-21 (1990).
107 Id. at 538.
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Scalia recognized that "conduct establishing a previously prose-
cuted offense was relied upon, not because that offense was a
statutory element of the second offense, but only because the
conduct would prove the existence of a statutory element."" 8
C. Justice Scalia's Critique of the
Pro-Grady Dissent
In his opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
Justice Souter set forth historical case law as support for Grady's
"same conduct" standard. First, Justice Souter looked to In Re
Nielsen °" to support his argument that Blockburger was not the
sole standard for analyzing alleged double jeopardy violations."'
Justice Souter focused on the Nielsen Court's language that
"where . . . a person has been tried and convicted for a crime
which has various incidents included in it, he cannot be a second
time tried for one of those incidents without being twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense."' Justice Souter interpreted "inci-
dents" to mean "acts," and thus reasoned "that a defendant 'can-
not be tried a second time' for a single act included as one of the
'various incidents' of a continuous crime for which he has already
been convicted.""' Furthermore, Justice Souter stipulated that
the Nielsen Court had not simply applied a lesser included offense
analysis, for if that analysis had in fact been applied, the Nielsen
Court would have reached the opposite conclusion."' Instead,
Justice Souter contended that "the Court was adopting the very
different rule that subsequent prosecution is barred for any charge
comprising an act that has been the subject of prior convic-
108 Id. at 538-39. See also Justice O'Connor's dissent stating that the Grady decision is
"inconsistent" with both the Dowling decision and the Federal Rules of Evidence, specifi-
cally Rule 404(b). Id. at 524-26 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
109 131 U.S. 176 (1889). Nielsen was charged with cohabitation during the period
from October 15, 1885 through May 13, 1888, in violation of a federal antipolygamy law.
Id. Nielsen pleaded guilty to the charge and subsequently served a three month prison
term and paid a $100 fine. Id. at 177. Nielsen was then charged with committing adul-
tery on May 14, 1888, which he contended was barred under the Double Jeopardy
Clause. In Dixon, Justice Souter interpreted the issue underlying the Nielsen case as
"whether double jeopardy applies where a defendant is first convicted of a continuing
offense and then indicted for some single act that the continuing offense includes." Unit-
ed States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2885 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting).
110 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2884.
111 Id. at 2885 (quoting In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 188 (1889)).
112 Id.
113 Id. at 2885-86.
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tion."" 4 In response, Justice Scalia claimed that reliance on the
term "incidents" as meaning acts was misplaced because "inci-
dents" had instead been defined as meaning "elements."' In
addition, Justice Scalia asserted that the Nielsen Court had, in fact,
applied the proposition that prosecution of the greater offense
bars a subsequent prosecution of the lesser offense."'
Second, Justice Souter, claiming that the Brown Court relied
on the Niesen decision, set forth the Brown decision to support the
conclusion that "the Blockburger test is not the only standard for
determining whether successive prosecutions impermissibly involve
the same offense.""' The Brown Court further stated: "Even if
two offenses are sufficiently different to permit the imposition of
consecutive sentences, successive prosecutions will be barred in
some circumstances where the second prosecution requires the
relitigation of factual issues already resolved by the first.""' How-
ever, Justice Souter's reliance on this footnote is misplaced. The
Supreme Court in Ashe recognized this simply as an exception to
the Blockburger standard."' Justice Scalia specifically noted that
the Brown Court acknowledged that Nielsen was "the first Supreme
Court case to endorse the Blockburger rule."2 '
Third, Justice Souter set forth Harris to support his argument
that the "same conduct test" should be upheld. Justice Souter ini-
tially acknowledged that the Harris Court applied a lesser included
offense analysis to determine that the petitioner could not be
prosecuted for the lesser crime of robbery with firearms after
being convicted of the greater crime of murder.'' However, Jus-
114 Id. at 2886.
115 Id. at 2860-61. Justice Scalia stated, "What it obviously means, however, is 'ele-
ment.' See Black's Law Dictionary 762 (6th ed. 1990) (defining 'incidents of ownership');
J. Bouvier, Law Dictionary 783-784 (1883) (defining 'incident' and giving examples of
'incident to a reversion,' and 'incidents' to a contract). That is perfectly clear from the
very next sentence of Nielsen (which Justice Souter does not quote): 'It may be contend-
ed that adultery is not an incident of unlawful cohabitation .... ' [Nelsen], 131 U.S. at
189." Dixon, 113 S.Ct. at 2861 n.10.
116 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2860-61.
117 Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166-67 n.6 (1976).
118 Id
119 The Ashe Court incorporated the doctrine of collateral estoppel within the Double
Jeopardy Clause. See supra note 102.
120 "The greater offense is therefore by definition the 'same' for purposes of double
jeopardy as any lesser offense included in it. This conclusion merely restates what has
been this Court's understanding of the Double Jeopardy Clause at least since In re Niel-
sen was decided in 1889." Brown, 432 U.S. at 168 (1976).
121 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2887 (quoting Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682, 682-83
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tice Souter went on to state that the court 'Justified that conclu-
sion in the circumstances of the case by quoting Nielsen's explana-
tion of the Blockburger test's insufficiency for determining when a
successive prosecution was barred."' From this, Justice Souter
concluded that both the Nielsen and Harris Courts relied on the
defendant's conduct to reach their decisions that the subsequent
prosecution must be barred.' In response, Justice Scalia asserted
that the Harris Court did not mention the word conduct in its
opinion but rather focused on the elements of the offenses: "[t]o
prove felony murder, 'it was necessary for all the ingredients of
the underlying felony' to be proved."' Although this statement
was correct, Justice Scalia interestingly did not apply it as to
Dixon's case and Count I in Foster's case.Is
Fourth, Justice Souter set forth the dictum of Vitale, 16 which
the Grady Court made binding precedent. According to Justice
Souter, the Vitale Court recognized Harris as a departure from the
traditional Blockburger standard, in that a court was also required
to consider conduct. 27 To this, Justice Scalia simply replied that
the Supreme Court's language regarding conduct was merely a
suggestion in Vitale, nothing more: "No Justice, the Vitale dissent-
ers included, has ever construed this passage as answering, rather
than simply raising, the question on which we later granted certio-
rari in Grady."2 ' The Vitale Court, according to Justice Scalia,
simply applied a lesser/greater included offense analysis.
Justice Souter's argument that the Grady-Vitale-Harris-Nielsen
line of cases represented over 100 years of case law advocating the
use of a "same conduct standard" was historically misplaced." As
Justice Scalia recognized, the standard for making determinations
as to whether a double jeopardy clause violation has occurred





123 IML at 2888.
124 Id. at 2861 (quoting Harris, 433 U.S. at 683 n.1).
125 See supra notes 76-88 for a discussion on the elements of the offenses with regard
to Dixon's case and Count I in Foster's case in his opinion, concurring in
part/dissenting in part.
126 See supra note 30.
127 Dixon, 113 S. CL at 2887-88.
128 Id. at 2861-62.
129 I& at 2891.
130 See supra notes 19-20.
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IV. LINGERING QUESTIONS
The Dixon Court overruled Grady's two prong standard and
returned to the traditional Blockburger test for Double Jeopardy
Clause analysis.'3 ' Accordingly, courts must focus on the statutory
elements of the offenses charged within separate prosecutions and
determine whether they constitute the "same offense."' Howev-
er, courts, relying on the Dixon decision for guidance may face
difficulty in properly applying this standard. Specifically, with re-
gard to Dixon's case and Count I in Foster's case, Justice Scalia
looked to the facts underlying the contempt orders rather than
the statutory elements of the offense of contempt, as required
under the Blockburger standard. Justice Scalia thus determined that
the substantive acts, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute
and simple assault, constituted the "same offense" as the crime of
contempt.'" In finding that the charge of contempt of court was
a "species of a lesser included offense" of the substantive act,"s
Justice Scalia appears to have focused on the underlying conduct
of the offenses. This analysis is surprising because Justice Scalia
went on to overrule the "same conduct test" set forth in Grady.
If the "same elements test" had been strictly applied, Justice Scalia
would have determined that the substantive acts and the contempt
charges required proof of an additional fact which the other did
not. The subsequent prosecutions for the substantive acts in both
131 In his dissenting opinion in Grady, Justice Scalia documented the roots of the
Blckburger standard in English common law and several early American cases. Grady v.
Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 530-36 (1990). See also Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338
(1911), Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906), Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass.
433 (1871), Commonwealth v. Roby, 12 Pickering 496 (Mass. 1832). But see United States
v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2885-86, 2888-90 (1993) (Justice Souter criticizes Justice Scalia's
reliance on Gavieres, Burton and Morey). Furthermore, the Supreme Court in each of its
major Double Jeopardy Clause decisions has recognized Blockburger as the established
standard, see supra notes 6-7, subject to a few well-acknowledged exceptions:
(1) "An exception may exist where the State is unable to proceed on the more serious
charge .at the outset because the additional facts necessary to sustain that charge have
not occurred or have not been discovered despite the exercise of due diligence"; Brown
v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 n.7 (1977) (quoting Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 448-
49 (1912)); (2) the doctrine of collateral estoppel as set forth in Ashe v. Swenson, 397
U.S. 436, 443 (1970). Brown and Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1980) "expand" the
Blockburger inquiry.
132 See supra note 1.
133 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2857-58.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 2860.
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Dixon's case and Count I in Foster's case thus should not have
been barred, as Chief Justice Rehnquist stated in his concurring in
part/dissenting in part opinion."' With regard to Counts II
through V in Foster's case, Justice Scalia did, in fact, focus on the
statutory elements of the offense of contempt and concluded that
the subsequent prosecution was not barred because the substantive
acts and the crime of contempt did not constitute the "same of-
fense." 137 Therefore, for an example of the proper application of
the Blockburger standard, courts should look to Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion with regard to Dixon's case and Count I in
Foster's case, and to Justice Scalia's opinion regarding Counts II
through V in Foster's case."
In addition, the question remains as to whether the policy
interests set forth in Blockburger or Green are to be given effect in a
double jeopardy case. The Green factors could simply be consid-
ered an extension of the Blockburger interest in finality. However,
use of the Blockburger standard does not guarantee that piecemeal
litigation will not occur, as demonstrated in the Grady decision. In
136 For Chief Justice Rehnquist's recognition and proper application of the traditional
Blockburger standard with regard to these counts, see supra notes 84-88 and accompanying
text.
137 United States v. Dixon 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2858-60 (1993).
138 Thus far, courts have had little difficulty in applying the Blodburger standard
which was revived by the Dixon Court. See, e.g., United States v. Colon-Osorio, 10 F.3d 41
(1st Cir. 1993); Steele v. Young, No. 93-7004, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 31683 (10th Cir.
Dec. 8, 1993); United States v. Welch, No. 92-1368, No. 92-1370, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS
34029 (1st Cir. Dec. 30, 1993); United States v. Sanchez, 3 F.3d 366 (lth Cir. 1993);
United States v. Adams, 1 F.d 1566 (lth Cir. 1993); United States v. Frayer, 9 F.3d
1367 (8th Cir. 1993).
The state courts remain split as to the proper standard to apply in a double
jeopardy case. Even though the United States Supreme Court overruled the Grady deci-
sion in Dixon, the Supreme Court of Hawaii chose to keep the "same conduct test" as
the proper standard for double jeopardy analysis. Hawaii v. Lessary, No. 15679, 1994
Haw. LEXIS 3 (Haw. Jan. 10, 1994). However, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin followed
the Dixon decision and utilized the traditional "same elements test" set forth in
Blockburger Wisconsin v. Kurzawa, No. 92-0926-CR, 1994 Wisc. LEXIS 6 (Wis. Jan. 12,
1994). In her concurring opinion, Justice Abrahamson recognized that "double jeopardy
jurisprudence is in disarray":
The double jeopardy clause in the federal constitution has become encrusted
with numerous conflicting decisions and interpretations. The 5-4 Dixon decision,
which overruled a 5-4 decision rendered barely three years earlier, produced five
opinions with the justices joining and rejecting various portions of each other's
opinions. When it requires a chart to determine which paragraphs of a United
States Supreme Court decision constitute the law of the land, you know you are
in trouble.
Id. at *37 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
[Vol. 69:3
COMMENT-DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE ANALYSIS
that case, Justice Brennan revealed that if the Supreme Court had
applied the Blockburger standard, Corbin would have been subject
to four separate prosecutions." 9 Arguably, after Dixon, the out-
come presented by Justice Brennan in the Grady decision remains
possible because the Dixon Court did not address the problem of
piecemeal litigation which the Blockburger standard allows.
If the Supreme Court wanted to maintain the policy interests
set forth in Green,1" an alternative standard would need to be
adopted. Justice Brennan has suggested a "same transaction test"
for analyzing potential Double Jeopardy Clause violations. 4' Un-
der this test, the prosecution would be required to 'join at one
trial all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single
criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction."" Justice
Brennan stated that this test would "best promote[] justice, econ-
omy and convenience,"" and would further the policy interests
set forth in Green."' In addition, Justice Brennan stated that
"[t]he Constitutional protection against double jeopardy is empty
of meaning if the State may make 'repeated attempts' to touch up
its case by forcing the accused to 'run the gauntlet' as many times
as there are victims of a single episode."
As support for the "same transaction test," Justice Brennan
relied on the language of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Both liberally promote
the joinder of parties and/or claims in a single trial." For ex-
ample, Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure pro-
vides for the joinder of charges that are similar in character, or
arise from the same transaction or from connected transactions or
from part of a common scheme or plan." 7 This standard pro-
tects a defendant's interest in not being subjected to "embarrass-
ment, expense and ordeal" and not being "compell[ed] to live in
a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity." "
139 Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 520 (1990).
140 See supra note 10.
141 See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453-60 (1970).
142 Id. at 453-54.
143 Id. at 450, 454.
144 See supra note 10.
145 Swenson, 397 U.S. at 459.
146 1 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, CRIMINAL 2D §141
(1982 & Supp. 1993).
147 FED. R. GRIM. P. 8(a).
148 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
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Despite Justice Brennan's focus on defining a standard which
properly addresses the policy concerns set forth in Green, the Su-
preme Court has "steadfastly refused to adopt the same transaction
test."" Justice Scalia has stated that although "the same transac-
tion test is rational and easy to apply,""' the Fifth Amendment
concerns relitigation of the "same offense," not the "same
transaction."' Therefore, even though the "same transaction
standard," unlike the Blockburger standard, would address the Green
policy interests, the Supreme Court will probably not adopt that
standard.
V. CONCLUSION
The Double Jeopardy Clause provides, "nor shall any person
be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb.""5 2 In Dixon, the Supreme Court determined that this
guarantee requires courts to apply the traditional Blockburger stan-
dard, i.e. the "same elements" test. Under this standard, courts
must determine whether the statutory elements of the offenses are
the same, as well as consider whether one offense is a lesser in-
cluded offense or a species of a lesser included offense of the oth-
er. By returning to the Blockburger analysis, the Supreme Court
adopted the narrow view of the Double Jeopardy Clause protec-
tion. As the test now stands, a defendant has no, constitutional
right to have all of the potential charges joined in a single prose-
cution, but rather may be subject to the "embarrassment, expense,
and ordeal" of severai prosecutions. Until the Supreme Court
reconciles the differing policy interests which were set forth in
Blockburger and Green, the "most intrepid judicial navigator" 3 will
continue to be forced to wade through this sea of confusion.
Kathryn A. Pamenter
149 Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 790 (1985).
150 Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 543 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
151 See supra note 1.
152 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
- 153 See supra note 4.
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